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The largest decile of commercial electricity customers comprises half of
commercial sector electricity usage. We quantify a substantial split incentives
problem that exists when these large ﬁrms are on electricity-included prop-
erty lease contracts. Using exogenous variation in weather shocks, we show
that customers on tenant-paid contracts use 6-14% less electricity in summer
months. The policy implications are promising. Nationwide energy savings
from aligning incentives for the largest 10% of commercial customers exceeds
analogous savings from the entire residential electricity sector. It is also cost-
eﬀective: switching to tenant-paid contracts via sub-metering has a private
payoﬀ period of under one year.
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1. Introduction
In this paper we identify the alignment of landlord and tenant incentives as an op-
portunity for cost-eﬀective pollution abatement. A principal agent problem arises
because of the separation between those who pay for energy usage and those who
make decisions about durable investments or consumption, leading to potential wel-
fare losses from excess energy use that even Pigouvian taxes are not well suited to
correct (Jaﬀe and Stavins (1994), Gillingham and Palmer (2014)). The welfare costs
may be particularly substantial in the commercial sector since these users account for
over 35 percent of end-use electricity consumption in the U.S., and about half of these
units are occupied by renters. Regulators and industry alike recognize the poten-
tial energy savings from tenant-paid utilities contracts, and have advocated for and
incorporated policies that would facilitate these contract types (NRDC (2011), IBE
(2011), ASHRAE (2012), USGBC (2009), USGBC (2013)), yet little direct evidence
exists in the commercial sector.
The possibility that misaligned incentives between a principal and an agent can
cause ineﬃciencies has been raised in many settings, including the design of em-
ployment, credit, insurance and agricultural contracts (Stiglitz (1974), Grossman
(1983), Chiappori and Salanie (2000), Goodwin (2001), Finkelstein and McGarry
(2006), Karlan and Zinman (2009), Einav et al. (2013)). Energy economists have
also weighed in on this question by testing for principal agent problems in the residen-
tial energy space (Levinson and Niemann (2004), Gillingham et al. (2012), Elinder
et al. (2017)). In this setting a frequently studied split incentive principal agent
problem takes the form of a tenant paid contract and underinvestment in energy
eﬃciency by the landlord. The logic, and one that has been corroborated by em-
pirical work, is that if tenants are not able to perfectly observe eﬃciency levels and
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are thus unwilling to pay a rent premium for energy eﬃciency, owners may forgo net
beneﬁcial energy conservation investments (Davis (2012), Myers (2014)). Our focus
is on split incentive problems created when energy bills are bundled into the monthly
rental contract. When a building occupant rents space and does not pay for their
monthly energy bill, they face a zero marginal cost for energy use, resulting in little
incentive to consider the impact of their energy consumption decisions.
Growing evidence points to modest energy savings from the introduction of
tenant-paid contracts for residential customers, but the literature has remained rel-
atively silent on the topic of commercial usage. The sparsity of empirical work in
this setting may be partly explained by the diﬃculty of disentangling the eﬀect of
split incentives from sorting by either tenants or landlords on the basis of energy
characteristics (Kahn et al. (2014)). Understanding the split incentive problem for
commercial customers is important since relative to their residential counterparts
they are large in size but few in number, and may oﬀer an opportunity to achieve
energy conservation at a lower cost. This paper aims to ﬁll this gap by taking ad-
vantage of a unique empirical setting and rich data to test for the eﬀect of split
incentives in the commercial sector, as well as explore heterogeneity in response to
contract type.
Our empirical approach uses variability in billing periods across ﬁrms to generate
exogenous diﬀerences in local weather within a calendar month. Local weather is
measured as the number of cooling degree days and heating degree days within a
given zip code and billing month. We combine these data with monthly billing
data from 1,126 ﬁrms serviced by a Connecticut electric utility between October
2007 and May 2011, and property-level information on ﬁxed observables including
whether the tenant or landlord pays the electric bill (we refer to this as contract
type throughout the manuscript). Endowed with panel data on both weather and
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usage, we then examine the diﬀerential impact of a local weather shock on electricity
usage across tenant-paid versus owner-paid contract types, controlling for aggregate
time shocks and ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects.
To interpret our results as the causal eﬀect of contract type on electricity usage
changes, we address two primary identiﬁcation challenges. First, we establish a com-
mon basis of comparison - a response gradient to a stimulus that inﬂuences demand
for electricity and that is exogenously experienced by ﬁrms of both contract types.
We use weather exposure within a given billing-cycle zip code as the exogenous elec-
tricity demand shifter. While ﬁrms in our sample are located within a relatively small
geographic region, their billing cycles are substantially non-overlapping. Variation
in temperature across days means that ﬁrms in diﬀerent billing cycles will experi-
ence diﬀerent temperature exposure based on the start- and end-dates of their billing
month. The diﬀerential temperature exposure allows us to compare the electricity-
temperature response gradient across ﬁrms that pay for their electricity and those
that do not.
Second, we address concerns that ﬁrms may select into contract type based on
unobservable characteristics that are correlated with the response gradient. Firms
with elastic electricity demand may be more inclined to select a tenant-pays rental
contract than those with inelastic demand. Ultimately, causal interpretation of our
results relies on an assumption that there is no such selection on unobservable ﬁrm
characteristics. We present three pieces of empirical evidence in support of this
assumption. First, we show that contract type is not systematically correlated with
a rich set of observable characteristics. If ﬁrms were strategically selecting into
contract type, we would expect to see low-demand (high-demand) ﬁrms selecting
into tenant-pay (owner-pay) contracts. We do not, and it is therefore unlikely that
they are self-selecting based on response gradient, a second-order attribute. Second,
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we exploit a change to an important energy metering regulation in Connecticut that
altered building owners' ability to select utility contract types in their buildings. This
change provides us an opportunity to test if changes in contract choice at the building
level are correlated with ﬁrm-level energy consumption characteristics. We ﬁnd that
they are not. Further we show that `switchers', or ﬁrms located in buildings whose
owners chose to select diﬀerent contracts after the regulatory change, do not exhibit
diﬀerential responses to the temperature gradient relative to the other ﬁrms in the
sample. Third, we assess the eﬀect of potential correlations between any remaining
unobservable characteristics and the treatment, as described in Oster (2016), to
identify bounds on our treatment eﬀect. The bounds implied by this technique
provide evidence that our conclusion is robust to such concerns. Collectively, these
tests support the assumption that diﬀerential sorting in response to the temperature
gradient is unlikely to confound the relationship between contract type and electricity
usage in our setting.
Our main result suggests that among the largest consumption ﬁrms, tenant-
paid contracts induce substantial energy savings. For the top decile of electricity
users switching from an owner-paid to tenant-paid utilities contract would reduce
electricity usage by about 1.4 percent per average daily cooling degree day. Over
the course of the year, the electricity savings from a tenant-paid contract among
top users amounts to roughly 3 percent, and in the summer months up to a 13
percent. The coeﬃcient bounds analysis proposed by Oster (2016) yields a lower
bound on savings of 0.7 percent per cooling degree day. Interestingly, for the other
90 percent of commercial customers contract type does not impact consumption
decisions. This behavior is consistent with a setting in which the beneﬁts from
changing consumption, in the form of bill savings, do not cover the adjustment costs
for small ﬁrms.
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Given the size of the responsive ﬁrms, the estimated treatment eﬀect translates
into signiﬁcant private and public beneﬁts (or costs) from the choice of contract
type. Using the Oster bounds, the private average annual utility bill savings from
a tenant-paid utilities contract among high usage ﬁrms is between 1.3-2.5 percent.
These eﬀects are large when aggregated. The private savings per ﬁrm are almost ﬁf-
teen times larger than the private household savings attributable to building energy
codes, and over ﬁfty times larger than the private savings from tenant-paid heating
in apartment buildings in the northeastern US (Jacobsen and Kotchen (2013), Levin-
son and Niemann (2004)). Were incentives to be aligned among all large commercial
ﬁrms nationwide, total energy saving would exceed those produced by solving the
split incentives problem for the entire residential electricity sector. Environmen-
tally, our estimates imply greenhouse gas savings of between 615-1200 thousand tons
of CO2 per year, or roughly 3.3 to 6.6 times the average annual savings achieved
from Weatherization Assistance Program retroﬁts performed in a given year. These
savings come at a relatively low cost - retroﬁtting units with sub-meters to allow
switching to tenant-paid utility bills amongst the highest decile of electricity users
has a payback period of less than one year.
Our work makes three contributions to the current dialogue on the design and
implementation of energy conservation programs, and may help guide policymakers
in their eﬀorts to conserve energy and combat climate change. First, relative to the
residential setting where a growing literature points to the potential and limitations
of energy conservation and eﬃciency programs (Gillingham et al. (2012), Hassett
and Metcalf (1999), Fowlie et al. (2015)), little is known about the transferability
of these instruments to commercial users. We provide a well identiﬁed counterpart
to existing residential estimates on the split incentives problem. Second, our results
reveal substantial heterogeneity in ﬁrm responsiveness to contract type and point
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to the importance of looking beyond average treatment eﬀects. The targeting of
contract restructuring based on a readily available observable (ﬁrm size) could yield
energy savings and cost eﬀectiveness comparable to oft-deployed behavioral energy
conservation tools (Allcott (2011), Allcott and Mullainathan (2010)). Lastly, our
results suggest that a targeted prescriptive policy of tenant-paid contracts would
be a net beneﬁcial addition to the portfolio of greenhouse gas abatement strategies
utilized by policymakers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses past literature
and our empirical setting. Section 3 describes the data used in our analysis. Section
4 presents our empirical speciﬁcation. Section 5 discusses our identiﬁcation strategy.
Section 6 describes our empirical results, presents our external and aggregate beneﬁt
estimates, and provides further context by discussing the private net beneﬁts of
energy conservation in the commercial sector. Section 7 concludes.
2.Background
Separating the party who pays for energy from the one making decisions about
usage has been frequently cited as creating incentives for energy over-consumption
(Prindle et al. (2007), Murtishaw and Sathaye (2006), Blumstein et al. (1980)).
Given that about 50 percent of oﬃce and retails buildings are tenanted, or non-
owner-occupied, the commercial sector has the potential to be a primary contributor
to this agency problem (EIA (2012)). However, this is also the sector for which the
least empirical evidence exists on the magnitude of the problem.
In the commercial and industrial sector, a reduction in the incentive to conserve
may lead to energy overconsumption along multiple dimensions. One end use that
can be aﬀected is air conditioning. Many buildings are over-cooled in the summer
months, leading to an increase in commercial electricity consumption of up to 8
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percent (Derrible and Reeder (2015)). Oﬃce equipment and miscellaneous electronics
usage may also increase if there are poor incentives to conserve. Sanchez et al. (2007)
ﬁnd that oﬃce equipment and miscellaneous equipment such as computers, personal
space heaters and fans account for up to 20 percent of annual electricity consumption
in the commercial sector. In retail settings, keeping doors open in the summer
months may also increase consumption by up to 9 percent (Basarir (2010)). Finally,
there may simply be inattention to electricity decisions in the commercial customer
population. This explanation is consistent with Jessoe and Rapson (2015), who
show that commercial customers are price inelastic when exposed to time-varying
electricity prices.
While the engineering literature has identiﬁed several channels through which
split incentives may aﬀect commercial sector consumption, a gap remains in our
understanding of its precise magnitude. One exception is Kahn et al. (2014). This
study notes that energy consumption by tenants who pay their own energy bills is 20
percent lower compared to owner-paid units, though this estimate reﬂects the eﬀect
of both contract type and sorting into buildings based on preferences for energy use.
In the residential sector, the consensus thus far is that the split incentive eﬀect on
aggregate consumption is likely modest. Levinson and Niemann (2004) ﬁnd that
energy bills are 1.7 percent higher when apartment dwellers do not pay for heat, and
Gillingham et al. (2012) ﬁnd occupants who pay for heating are 16 percent more
likely to change their heat settings at night.1 Note that aligning ﬁnancial incentives
does not a priori guarantee that agents will exhibit price-sensitivity in their decisions.
In the residential electricity setting, consumers have been shown to be inattentive
1Another dimension to the principal agent problem is less than eﬃcient turnover from oil-ﬁred to
gas-ﬁred boilers used for residential heating in the northeastern U.S (Myers (2014)). This outcome is
consistent with tenant asymmetric information about heating costs when they pay for heat. Myers
(2014) ﬁnds that this led to 37 percent higher annual heating costs in the 1990-2009 period, which
is a considerable eﬀect.
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to their electricity bills (see, for example, Jessoe et al. (2014)). This is potentially
a result of the relatively small ﬁnancial rewards at stake. Casual observers of the
commercial space may conjecture that the proﬁt motive and higher usage levels will
lead to more attention and also a larger split incentives problem, and one would
expect that to be true in the absence of adjustment costs.
The regulations surrounding metering in Connecticut make it an advantageous
setting in which to study the split incentives problem. To get a sense for the regu-
latory landscape, consider the owner of a multi-tenanted building. Monitoring each
tenants individual electricity usage would require the installation of a sub-meter.
However, prior to the summer of 2013 the state prohibited the retroﬁtting of com-
mercial and multi-family buildings with sub-meters. As a result, only buildings con-
structed with sub-meters could charge individual tenants for energy consumption.
In all other buildings electricity consumption was monitored at the building level,
and thus tenants signed landlord-pay contracts. Since our analysis focuses on the
time period 2007 to 2011, the presence of sub-meters in buildings is predetermined
from the perspective of current owners and tenants. While tenants are still able to
choose buildings based on electricity contract type, doing so limits their choice set
to sub-metered buildings, an implicit cost.
In 2013, new legislation passed by the Connecticut General Assembly eliminated
this prohibition (Hartford Business Journal (2013), Murtha Cullina LLC (2013)).
While we cannot directly test the eﬀect of this change on electricity use, the legislative
change enables us to gain further insights into selection on contract type based on
ﬁrm and building-level energy preferences. We obtain data on contract switchers in
the post-2013 period, where switchers are deﬁned as ﬁrms located in buildings that
changed their contract type from owner-paid to tenant-paid utilities, or vice versa.
Altogether 65 ﬁrms were located in one of these buildings.
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We evaluate our research questions within the jurisdiction of United Illuminating
(UI), an investor owned electric utility in Connecticut that services customers in 17
Connecticut counties. Figure 1 shows its service territory. Most UI customers heat
their homes with natural gas or fuel oil rather than electricity (EIA (2016)), leading
us to hypothesize that electricity use will be most responsive to weather conditions
in the summer months, when air-conditioning use is high.
3 Data
We combine three data sets to form a panel of of 40,962 observations from 1,126
ﬁrms that we use in our analysis. The ﬁrst data set is monthly billing data provided
by UI that reports account-level electricity consumption (in kWh), peak monthly
throughput (in kW), and expenditure. These data also contain information on the
industrial classiﬁcation number, or NAICS code of each account. The second source
is the CoStar Group, a commercial sector multiple listing service and database that
includes property-level information on utility contracts and hedonic characteristics
such as building size, stories and year of construction. Third, we obtained daily tem-
perature data from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).
Table 1 identiﬁes the property types that make up our sample. The predominant
share of accounts are located in oﬃce buildings (72 percent), followed by industrial
buildings (22 percent), then by retail and ﬂex buildings, which combine oﬃce and
retail functions (6 percent). Table 2 presents sample summary statistics on usage,
location and industry by contract type. In our sample, about 84% of ﬁrms pay their
own electricity bill. The average customer (across contract types) spends about $675
a month on electricity, the average building is approximately three stories, and the
primary industry is `Finance, Real Estate and Management', which makes up about
50 percent of the sample among both contract types. The sample in both contract
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types is also evenly regionally distributed, with about 30 percent of observations in
central cities, and the rest located in more suburban areas.2
3.1 Weather
In our study, weather is measured as the number of cooling degree days and heating
degree days in a zip code billing-month. To arrive at this observational unit, we
begin by using daily temperature data collected from ten local weather stations to
construct daily cooling degree days (CDD) and heating degree days (HDD) at each
weather station. CDD are obtained by subtracting 65 from the average Fahrenheit
temperature on a given day with temperatures above 65 and HDD are obtained by
subtracting the average Fahrenheit temperature on a given day from 65 on days with
temperatures below 65.3 These daily weather station measures are used to compute
daily zip code level weather using inverse distance weighting, and are then summed
across billing-month in each zip code to obtain monthly CDD and HDD. Finally, for
ease of coeﬃcient interpretation, we divide cumulative CDD and HDD in each billing
period by total days in that (roughly monthly) billing period to arrive at average
daily CDD and HDD.
This observational unit provides both cross-sectional and temporal variation in
weather. One source of cross-sectional variation arises from temperature diﬀerences
across the 32 zip codes in UI's service territory. This is made clear in Figure 2 which
2The last column of Table 2 presents the normalized diﬀerence, which is measured as the diﬀer-
ence in averages for each variable, by treatment status, scaled by the square root of the sum of the




, where X¯i denotes
the mean of a given covariate by utility contract status i = 0, 1, and S2i denotes the sample variance
of Xi. The normalized diﬀerence is preferable as a measure of overlap than a t-test, since this latter
measure depends on the sample size, whereas overlap in any given sample is a concept independent
of sample size (Imbens and Wooldridge (2009)).
3CDD measure demand for space cooling services such as air conditioning since as temperature
rises above 65 cooling demand increases. HDD measure demand for space heating services since
heating demand increases as temperature falls under 65.
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displays the daily temperature by zip code between October 2007 and May 2011.
Despite the relatively small region, there is visible cross-sectional variation in daily
temperatures with summer temperatures varying between 5 to 10 degrees across zip
codes. Variation in weather also occurs because of diﬀerences in billing cycles - which
denote the start date and end date of a billing period - across ﬁrms. In our sample,
there are 16 unique billing cycles, where ﬁrm assignment to a billing cycle is based
on geography. The staggering of billing cycles throughout a month provides a second
source of cross-sectional variation in weather due to the fact that a hot day may be
included in diﬀerent billing months for ﬁrms on diﬀerent bill cycles.
4.Empirical Speciﬁcation
Using the dataset described in Section 3, we estimate the responsiveness of energy
consumption to weather variation by contract type across consumption deciles in our
sample. We seek to retrieve the dose response function of temperature on electricity
use, and to measure how it diﬀers across tenants as a result of exposure to diﬀerent
contract types.
Our basic empirical model is summarized by equation (1):
Yit = βd[Czt × 1id, Hzt × 1id] + θdTenanti × [Czt × 1id, Hzt × 1id]
+ ηit+ αt + γi + εit (1)
where Yit is the logarithm of monthly energy consumption for tenant i in billing
month t, Czt andHzt are average daily cooling and heating degree days for a ﬁrm with
billing month t in zip code z. A vector of indicator variables is denoted by 1id and
set equal to 1 if tenant i has electricity demand in decile d (i.e. d = {1, ..., 10}), and
zero otherwise. The indicator variable for whether a tenant i pays their own utility
bills is interacted with each of the weather variables, Tenanti× [Czt×1id, Hzt×1id].
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Additional controls include ηit, an account-speciﬁc time trend, γi, an account ﬁxed
eﬀect, and αt is a calendar month-by-year ﬁxed eﬀect. We can condition on this
latter ﬁxed eﬀect since our identifying variation utilizes billing-month weather and
consumption rather than calendar month variation. To adjust for serial correlation,
standard errors are clustered at the building level.
Our empirical approach identiﬁes the diﬀerential impact of weather shocks on
energy usage across customers who pay and do not pay their own electricity bill, and
is similar to the approach deployed in Jacobsen and Kotchen (2013). If the eﬀect of
tenants paying the utility bills (rather than owners) decreases energy use, we would
expect to observe a negative coeﬃcient on the interaction between Tenanti and Czdt
across each consumption decile. The eﬀect of cooling degree days is the primary
variable of interest because it is a strong predictor of air conditioning utilization,
and therefore highly correlated with electricity consumption in the summer months.
5. Identiﬁcation
Since contract type is not randomly assigned in our empirical setting, the main con-
cern from the perspective of identiﬁcation is that ﬁrms on a landlord-pay contract
are selected in some unobservable way that relates to their latent dose-response func-
tion. An unbiased estimate relies on our main identifying assumption: conditional
on observables and ﬁxed eﬀects, the dose response function diﬀers only by contract
type, and does not diﬀer as a result of a reaction to the temperature gradient that
correlates with unobservable ﬁrm attributes. Since this assumption is not directly
testable, our strategy is to expose it to many opportunities to fail. This section
describes the tests that we perform as well as the empirical evidence that allows us
to proceed with conﬁdence in a causal interpretation of our estimates.
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5.1 Selection into Contract Type
We present three approaches to assess the possibility that tenants are able to select
into a rental space with their desired contract type. Our ﬁrst approach evaluates
covariate balance among tenant-paid and owner-paid contracts in the full sample,
which we implement both by examining summary statistics in the data and more
formally by estimating logistic regressions of contract type on observables. Second,
we exploit a policy change in Connecticut that relaxed restrictions on sub-metering
retroﬁts after the end of our sample period. This enables us to (i) identify and
(ii)investigate the characteristics and behavior of ﬁrms located in buildings that
subsequently switched contract types. The third method is a deployment of Oster
(2016) that places bounds on potential selection bias.
Balance on Observables: We begin by comparing owner and tenant-paid con-
tracts, both in the full sample and for the top decile of users, across a number of
observables that we hypothesize may be related to contract type. The last column of
Table 2 presents the normalized diﬀerence in means between the two contract types
in the full sample, where a normalized diﬀerence lower than 0.25 in absolute value is
typically considered good overlap (Imbens and Wooldridge (2009)). As shown, the
covariates are balanced along the rich set of covariates we observe. Since our main re-
sult will focus on the tenant-paid contract eﬀect in the top consumption decile, Table
3 presents covariate balance for these users. While the consumption variables main-
tain good overlap in this sample, the number of stories has a normalized diﬀerence of
-0.55 and the industry classiﬁcations for Finance, Education and Entertainment are
slightly out of balance. Diﬀerences in building height and the lack of balance in the
Finance category are driven by a small number of owner-paid buildings that are over
nine stories and occupied by ﬁnancial tenants. We later address these imbalances
in a robustness test. Education and Entertainment each make up a small share of
14
the sample, with 9 percent and 15 percent of ﬁrms in each industry, respectively.
Notably, the most energy intensive industrial classiﬁcations display balanced shares
of tenant-paid contracts.
Along the same lines, we estimate a logistic regression to examine the relationship
between contract type and observable characteristics. Column (1) of Table 4 presents
the results of a logistic regression of a tenant-paid utilities dummy, set equal to one if
tenants pay their own utility bills, on ﬁrm-level observables in the full sample. Peak
load and bill length are signiﬁcant in predicting contract type. As shown in column
(2), the eﬀects of bill length and peak load on contract type are driven by outliers.
After the omission of two ﬁrms with excessively high peak load and a few observations
with abnormally long bill lengths, no observables are signiﬁcant in predicting contract
type. Column (3) restricts the sample to the top consumption decile and column (4)
further restricts the sample by excluding buildings with more than nine stories. We
ﬁnd that with the exception of the number of stories, no observable is signiﬁcant in
predicting contract type, and that this eﬀect is no longer present once we remove
very tall buildings. The covariate overlap and logistic regression results suggest no
fundamental relationships between the observables and contract type, and while this
does not imply that unobservables are balanced across contract type, it provides a
ﬁrst line of evidence to support the plausibility of our main identifying assumption.
Finally, we examine the robustness of our results to concerns about sorting along
a number of observables by augmenting equation (1) to incorporate other covariate
interactions with CDD and HDD. This is reﬂected in equation (2),
Yit = βd[Czt × 1id, Hzt × 1id] + θdTenanti × [Czt × 1id, Hzt × 1id]
+ψXi × [Czt, Hzt] + Bit + ηit+ αt + γi + εit, (2)
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where ψXi × [Czt, Hzt] is the covariate vector interacted with heating and cooling
degree days, Xi includes indicator variables for building type and ﬁrm NAICS code,
and Bit measures the number of days in the billing month (bill length) for ﬁrm i in
billing month t.
Contract Switchers: Our second approach takes advantage of a policy change
that occurred after the end of our sample period. Within our sample period, a ban
on sub-metering retroﬁts in Connecticut made sorting by customers and building
owners along contract type very costly, if not impossible. Customers that desired at-
tributes of a building not sub-metered may have preferred to pay their own electricity
and landlords may have preferred to oﬀer tenant-paid utilities. However retroﬁtting
buildings with unit-level electricity meters, a prerequisite for tenant-paid contract-
ing, was not permitted. In 2013, about two years after our sample period ended, this
restriction was lifted and landlords were allowed to retroﬁt buildings with sub-meters.
We use building-level tenancy contract information collected a year and a half
after the Connecticut legislative change, in early 2015, to assess whether sorting based
on energy consumption preferences might have occurred once sub-metering retroﬁts
were allowed. Since the legislative change allowed a more ﬂexible re-matching of
tenants into contract type, this presents an opportunity to observe who switched,
and to examine whether controlling for their identity changes our baseline results.
Under the null hypothesis of no selection, conditioning on the identity of these
switchers should not alter our estimated treatment eﬀect.
Roughly six percent of customers switched contract types, with 34 owners mov-
ing to a tenant-paid contract by early 2015 and 31 transitioning to an owner-paid
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contract.4 In Table 5 we show that total consumption, peak usage, and total bill is
balanced across switchers and non-switchers.5 The balance in energy consumption
characteristics across these groups suggests that controlling for these users may not
substantively change the results. Still, to test our null hypothesis directly, we build
on our baseline speciﬁcation and interact two switcher indicator variables - one for
ﬁrms switching to tenant-paid contracts and a second for ﬁrms switching to owner
paid contracts - with cooling and heating degree days.
Oster Bounds: Our ﬁnal approach to testing our identifying assumption uses
a new technique proposed by Oster (2016). This method requires the assumption
that the relationship between treatment and unobservables can be recovered from the
relationship between treatment and observables. If true, movements in the coeﬃcient
of interest and R-squared levels from the inclusion of control variables inform us about
selection on unobservables. We retrieve the bounds in a post-estimation procedure
and present these results in Section 6.
5.2 Time-Varying Unobservables
The assignment of bill cycles based on geography and our decision to exploit variation
in weather across billing cycles raises the possibility that bill cycle might be correlated
with the dose response function across contract type. We investigate this by testing
if a systematic relationship between bill cycle and weather exists. A regression of
weather on bill cycle ﬁnds that that the sixteen billing cycles are neither jointly nor
individually signiﬁcant in explaining cooling degree days or heating degree days.6
4Given the long-term nature of building ownership and commercial sector contracts, it's unlikely
that ownership of these buildings or the tenants occupying them changed over time. Mean lease
length in the industries in our sample is over 4 years, with a 60% renewal rate (Fisher and Ciochetti
(2007)).
5Interestingly, buildings that switch to a tenant-paid contract tend to be larger and taller, which
suggests economies of scale to sub-metering.
6Results available from authors upon request.
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Still, our empirical approach explicitly addresses this concern by conditioning on bill
cycle in all our empirical speciﬁcations.
A related concern is that the dose response function to weather partly reﬂects
diﬀerences in bill length (i.e. the number of a days in a billing month) across ﬁrm-
months. This will confound our interpretation of the treatment eﬀect if bill length is
systematically related to contract type. We control for this possibility by including
bill length as a control in equation (2), as noted above.
6.Results
Our ﬁndings suggest contract type induces economically and statistically signiﬁcant
impacts on consumption choices for the largest electricity consumers. The reduced
form relationship between contract type, ﬁrm size, temperature and electricity con-
sumption is presented in Figure 3. It plots electricity consumption against average
temperature within 1-degree bins, across both contract types, for the bottom nine
decile of ﬁrms in panel (a), and the top consumption decile in panel (b). Super-
imposed on each scatter plot is a lowess ﬁt of consumption on temperature. This
ﬁgure provides a preview to our formal regression results and points to three in-
teresting patterns of ﬁrm behavior. First, as shown in panel (a), on average there
is almost no discernible diﬀerence in consumption by contract type across the dis-
tribution of temperatures in the bottom nine consumption deciles. Second, in the
top consumption decile, shown in panel (b), we observe a signiﬁcant divergence in
usage across contract types, with ﬁrms under owner-paid utility contracts exhibiting
higher usage, relative to tenant-paid ﬁrms. Third, this diﬀerence in usage becomes
more pronounced when air-conditioning demand rises. Consumption levels begin to
diverge more sharply once temperature increases beyond approximately 65 F, the
temperature at which demand for cooling typically begins (EPA (2014)).
18
Table 6 presents our formal regression results. Column (1) shows the eﬀect of
a regression comparing the diﬀerential impact of a weather shock on ﬁrms with a
tenant-paid contract type relative to an owner-paid contract, controlling for ﬁrm,
month-year ﬁxed eﬀects and ﬁrm-speciﬁc time trends. We ﬁnd that without condi-
tioning on consumption decile there is no diﬀerence in the eﬀect of weather shocks
on consumption among tenant-paid versus owner-paid contracts. In the remainder
of Table 6, we report results from the estimation of equations (1) and (2). Column
(2) reports results from our base speciﬁcation as shown in equation (1), where we
introduce tenant-paid contract interactions with CDD and HDD across all ten con-
sumption deciles; column (3) controls for the diﬀerential eﬀect of temperature shocks
on switchers and column (4) further conditions on the interaction of CDD and HDD
with building and industry type, as shown in (2). Column (5) presents a robustness
check which excludes outliers from the sample, leaving us with a sample in which
all observables for ﬁrms in the top consumption decile are balanced across contract
type.7
Our results indicate that a split incentive problem leads to overconsumption of
energy among the top decile of electricity consumers. This eﬀect is quantitatively
and qualitatively robust to several speciﬁcations, suggesting that ﬁrms on a utilities
included contract exhibit a diﬀerent dose response function to weather than ﬁrms
who pay their own utility bills.8 Focusing on our preferred speciﬁcation in column
(4), we ﬁnd that a tenant-paid contract leads to about a 1.4 percent decrease in
kWh per average daily CDD for the top decile of electricity consumers. Over the
course of the year, which has an average daily CDD of 2.1, this translates into a 2.9
7We exclude two ﬁrms with high peak load, four buildings with ten or more stories and bill
length outliers in the sixth decile.
8Note that the switchers interaction coeﬃcients are not reported for space considerations, but
they are insigniﬁcant in all speciﬁcations in which they appear.
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percent decrease in annual electricity usage among the top decile of users. Framed
diﬀerently, for ﬁrms on a tenant-paid contract a one standard deviation increase
in daily CDD leads to a 5 percent reduction in monthly usage relative to utilities
included ﬁrms. In contrast, contract type does not statistically impact consumption
decisions for the other 90 percent of commercial ﬁrms. This large divergence in
response to contract type based on ﬁrm size points to a ﬁrst source of heterogeneity
in response to treatment, and potentially large savings from the targeted deployment
of a policy instrument.
A second source of heterogeneity results from seasonal variation in the treatment
eﬀect. We ﬁnd that the split incentive can lead to signiﬁcant increases in electricity
usage but only during the hot summer months. This can be seen in Figure 4, which
illustrates the estimated diﬀerence in usage across contract type for each month in
our sample. It is obtained by multiplying the treatment eﬀect reported in column (4)
of Table 6 by average daily CDDs in a given month. In August, switching from an
owner to a tenant-paid contract would reduce electricity consumption by about 13%.
The summer response is consistent with a framework in which demand for electric
AC during these hot months drives the divergence in the dose response function
across owner and tenant-paid contracts. 9
Though contract type only inﬂuences electricity choices for a narrow set of cus-
tomers during a concentrated period of time, restructuring contract type has mean-
ingful implications for aggregate electricity usage. This is because the responsive
ﬁrms are the largest electricity consumers and are quite sensitive to hot tempera-
tures. A policy that switched the largest decile of electricity consuming ﬁrms from
an owner to tenant-paid contract would result in annual electricity savings per ﬁrm
9The coeﬃcients on heating degree days (not reported) are not statistically signiﬁcant in any
speciﬁcation. Since most ﬁrms in Connecticut use natural gas or fuel oil for heating, it is not
surprising that the dose response function for heating does not vary across contract type.
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of roughly 19,200 kWh. Comparing these savings to the total quantity of electricity
consumed by all commercial ﬁrms in our sample, we ﬁnd that this policy change
would lead to a 1.4 percent reduction in total electricity usage.
We also estimate the eﬀect of contract type on electricity expenditure by esti-
mating (2), the fully controlled speciﬁcation, with log monthly bill as the dependent
variable; results are shown in Table 6 column (6). The estimated treatment eﬀect
in the top decile is a 1.2 percent decrease in monthly bill per CDD. The value of
total bill savings among these high consumers is approximately $315 per summer
month. In the month of August the savings represent a 10% reduction in electricity
expenditures.
To further gauge the robustness of our results to potential selection on unob-
servables, we apply the bounds analysis proposed by Oster (2016). We make an
equal selection assumption which implies that any residual omitted variable bias is
a function of (i) the treatment coeﬃcient after the inclusion of covariates and (ii)
R-squared values before and after the inclusion of covariates. Given our rich set of
controls, the equal selection assumption is likely conservative, as it assumes that any
remaining unobservables are at least as important as the observables in explaining
the treatment (Oster (2016) and Altonji et al. (2008)). Table 7 reports the identiﬁed
set estimates from two diﬀerent speciﬁcations with log usage and log bill as the de-
pendent variables, respectively, in the full sample. They assume that the maximum
possible R2 is 0.98, given the estimated 2 percent measurement error in electricity
meter readings (Dong et al. (2005), Reddy et al. (1997)). As shown in Table 7 we
continue to detect a split incentives eﬀect after accounting for any remaining selection
on unobservables. A tenant-paid contract induces at minimum a monthly electricity
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and bill saving of 0.7 and 0.6 percent per CDD, respectively.10
6.1 Social beneﬁts and payback period
In this section we estimate the avoided emissions, decline in environmental dam-
ages and payback period from shifting to a tenant-paid utility contracts in our sample.
We begin by identifying the per kWh emissions rates and marginal damages of four
pollutants regulated by the federal government: NOx, SO2, PM2.5 and CO2. We
choose these four because of their links to human health damages and contributions
to climate change. For NOx, SO2 and CO2, the Environmental Protection Agency's
eGRID database provides 2009 emission rates for the New England subregion, mea-
sured as tons emitted per MWh of electricity produced.11 The PM2.5 emission rate
estimate is obtained from Connors et al. (2005). Marginal damage estimates for
NOx, SO2 and PM2.5 come from Muller and Mendelsohn (2007), and marginal CO2
damages represent an average of the estimates presented in IWGSCC (2015) and
IWGSCC (2010).12
We then combine the above marginal damages and emissions rates with our es-
timated treatment eﬀects to bound the social beneﬁts of switching from an owner
to tenant-paid contract. For the top decile of electricity consumers, we use the per
CDD coeﬃcient from column (4) of Table 6, our preferred speciﬁcation, as an upper
bound estimate (this is also the Oster upper bound), and the Oster lower bound
savings estimate reported in Table 7. We multiply these by the average CDD in the
summer months for each ﬁrm with a tenant-paid utility contract to arrive at a per
10All the energy and bill savings ranges reported in the paper are based on these Oster identiﬁed
set estimates.
11The eGRID database is available at the EPA's website at www.epa.gov/energy/egrid.
12IWGSCC (2015) presents an updated social cost of carbon estimate relative to IWGSCC (2010),
and is a better reﬂection of the scientiﬁc consensus on climate change impacts. However the 2010
report coincides with our sample period which is why we also choose to include it.
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ﬁrm annual electricity savings of 9,700 to 19,200 kWh. These consumption savings
are used to form our bounds for avoided damages from the four pollutants.
The upper and lower bound estimates for avoided pollution-related external costs
are presented in Table 8. Annually, the per ﬁrm value of avoided damages ranges
from $111 to $221. If we add to this the private bill savings of $677 to $1265 per
ﬁrm-year, the annual ﬁrm-level social beneﬁt of switching from an owner to tenant-
paid contract amounts to $788 to $1709. For comparison, these savings are about
ﬁfteen times larger than the household-level savings attributable to building energy
standards and over ﬁfty times larger than the household bill savings from tenant-
paid heating in apartment buildings in the northeastern US (Jacobsen and Kotchen
(2013), Levinson and Niemann (2004)).
At the national level, restructuring rental contracts for the largest ten percent of
commercial ﬁrms would produce energy savings exceeding those from restructuring
rental contracts for all residential users who don't pay for their utilities.13 It would
also save between 615-1200 thousand tons of CO2 per year or between 3.3 to 6.6
times the average annual savings achieved from Weatherization Assistance Program
retroﬁts performed in a given year.14
Finally, we use data on the costs of sub-metering to calculate back-of-the enve-
lope estimates of the payback period from sub-metering individual units and shifting
to a tenant-paid contract. Sub-meter costs range from $250-$1000 per unit (Pike
13There are 131 million residential electricity customers in the US, of which 10.4 million are
rented with utilities included (EIA (2009)). Assuming they save 0.7% per household (Levinson and
Niemann (2004)), total savings are 141 million kWh per year. There are approximately 17.6 million
commercial sector electric customers in the US (EIA (2017)), 50 percent of which rent space, or
about 8.8 million customers. Suppose 20 percent (1.76 million) have an owner-paid utilities contract,
the same share as in Connecticut. The top consumption decile, 176,000 customers, save a total of
181 million kWh per year (1.3%) from a switch to tenant-pay contracts.
14An average of 175,000 WAP retroﬁts are performed every year, which save approximately 1.06
tons of CO2 per household per year (Fowlie et al. (2015), DOE (2017), EIA (2010)). These retroﬁts
therefore save 186,000 tons of CO2 every year.
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Research (2012), White (2012), Millstein (2008)). Given our average estimated an-
nual bill savings of $970 (the average of the bill savings obtained using the Oster
identiﬁed set estimates), and assuming a unit-level sub-meter cost of $625, the pay-
back period is less than one year, well below the payback threshold for most ﬁrms'
energy conservation investments (Anderson and Newell (2004)).15 These values also
compare quite favourably to other cost-eﬀective energy eﬃciency programs (Allcott
and Mullainathan (2010)). With a unit- or ﬁrm-level sub-meter cost of $625 incurred
up-front and an average annual treatment eﬀect of 14,500 kWh saved among high
consuming ﬁrms, the cost eﬀectiveness is 4.3 cents per kWh after the ﬁrst year, 2.1
cents per kWh after two years, and 1.4 cents after 3 years, assuming the annual
electricity savings persist at the same level.
6.2 The Non-Response of Most Commercial Firms
While we estimate that contract type has a sizable eﬀect on electricity usage for
the largest ﬁrms, one unanswered question is why the remaining 90% of commercial
ﬁrms do not respond to contract type. In our view, the most likely explanation is that
even when tenants face the costs of their energy consumption choices, the net beneﬁts
of decreasing electricity consumption or investing in energy eﬃciency are negative.
This is consistent with a growing strand of research that documents negative realized
net beneﬁts from energy eﬃciency investments (Hassett and Metcalf (1999), Fowlie
et al. (2015)). It is also consistent with (potentially rational) inattention that leads
commercial ﬁrms to be unresponsive to some ﬁnancial incentives (Jessoe and Rapson
(2015)). In this section we provide evidence for this hypothesis by performing a coarse
15In most states sub-meter system costs can be recovered through surcharges on tenant utility
bills. This enables owners to recover their investments costs. If the owner's surcharge doesn't
recover the full value of the savings, the payback period may be longer, but our estimates would
still represent a social payback period.
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cost-beneﬁt analysis for a common behavioral change ﬁrms can undertake to save
energy. We then go on to document other potential explanations for why ﬁrms may
not mitigate their energy consumption under a tenant-paid contract.
Let us consider the electricity choices of an oﬃce building, the sector that makes
up the largest share of buildings in our sample. Building overcooling and overheating
are common in oﬃce buildings, and some occupants' behavioral responses, such as
keeping personal heaters or fans on, also contribute to increasing energy consumption.
Derrible and Reeder (2015) suggest that overcooling increases electricity consumption
by 8 percent per year, and Sanchez et al. (2007) estimate portable heaters consume
329 kWh per year. Using these numbers, for the bottom nine deciles of our sample,
the combination of overcooling and space heating amounts to 4300 kWh of annual
electricity consumption, or $530 on an annual basis. Since addressing overcooling
would likely require hiring a property manager or engineer to monitor and adjust
air conditioner and chiller operation, and may compromise comfort among some
occupants, the total cost of avoiding overcooling may well exceed the $530 reduction
in expenditure.
Other explanations could also account for the lack of a treatment eﬀect across
most ﬁrms. One possibility is rational inattention. Comparing the $677 to $1265
annual bill saving from a tenant-paid contract to the average commercial unit size
in Connecticut, 14,000 square feet, suggests an average annual bill saving of about
4.8-9 cents per square foot. This represents about 0.2 percent of the average an-
nual revenues per square foot in oﬃce and retail industries, and highlights that the
savings smaller ﬁrms forego likely represent a very small share of their annual sales.
After accounting for the time and eﬀort required to accurately assess the energy sav-
ings from diﬀerent energy eﬃciency investments, ﬁrms may be rationally inattentive




We measure the `split incentive' eﬀect of tenancy contract type using a unique empir-
ical setting and novel dataset of tenancy contracts and energy use among commercial
sector clients. Our approach takes multiple steps to probe and address the empirical
challenge of separately identifying the split incentive problem from sorting. We show
that contract type is not systematically correlated with a rich set of observable char-
acteristics; that changes in contract choice at the building level are not correlated
with energy consumption; and that our result is robust to a conservative assump-
tion about any remaining correlation between unobservable characteristics and our
treatment.
Our results indicate heterogeneous returns to a tenant-paid contract, with a posi-
tive and signiﬁcant eﬀect of contract type only in the top decile of electricity consum-
ing ﬁrms. The results are consistent with privately optimal decision-making by ﬁrms
since the bill savings from conservation behavior are relatively small across most
of the consumption distribution, likely not large enough to justify energy eﬃciency
investments or behavioral changes.
This study is a rare contribution to the split incentive literature on commer-
cial customers that credibly addresses sorting. The result implies a strong case for
encouraging tenant-paid energy contracting among large commercial and industrial
customers. For the largest decile of electricity consumers, we ﬁnd that ﬁrms who pay
their own utility bills consume about 3% less electricity annually than tenants whose
utility bills are bundled into rents and save between $677 and $1265 on their annual
electricity bills. These reductions lead to a 1.4 percent saving in total electricity con-
sumed by all ﬁrms in our sample, and generate annual external beneﬁts of $111 and
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$221. The payback period from sub-metering and switching to a tenant-paid contract
is less than one year, and the cost-eﬀectiveness among high consumers is compara-
ble to behavioural and other interventions that have recently received signiﬁcant
attention in the energy setting (Allcott (2011), Allcott and Mullainathan (2010)). A
targeted policy of sub-metering and tenant-paid contract promotion would likely be
a net beneﬁcial addition to the portfolio of mitigation strategies utilized by policy-
makers.
When compared to other locations, our estimated consumption and bill savings
may present a lower bound. We study the question of split-incentives in Connecti-
cut, a location where most consumers rely on natural gas for heating and where
summer temperatures may be relatively mild. In locations with a high penetration
of electric heating, we may ﬁnd that contract type impacts demand for heating. In
the southwestern and southeastern states with warmer temperatures and higher air
conditioning usage, the savings from restructuring contract may also be larger.
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Figure 1: UI Territory
Notes: United Illuminating's service territory. It oﬀers electricity distribution services to 17 counties
in Connecticut, an area totaling 335 square miles.
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Average Temperature
Notes: Average daily temperature in UI's service territory between October 2007 and May 2011,
at the zip code level. Despite the relatively small region, there is visible cross-sectional variation in
daily temperatures, with summer temperatures varying between 5 to 10 degrees across zip codes.
Temperature variation within a zip code is also possible, due to diﬀerences in billing cycles across
ﬁrms
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Figure 3: Consumption By Contract Type
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Notes: Each scatter plot presents monthly electricity consumption against average temperature
within 1-degree bins, for the bottom nine decile of ﬁrms in panel (a), and the top consumption
decile in panel (b). The observations are color-coded by contract type, in both the bottom nine
deciles (panel (a)), and the top consumption decile (panel (b)). The solid lines are a lowess ﬁt of
the same data.
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Notes: The Figure shows average treatment eﬀect on consumption in the top consumption decile,
shown as blue circles. It is obtained by multiplying the estimated treatment coeﬃcient by monthly
cooling degree days, in a regression that corresponds to column (4) in Table 6. The resulting
ﬁrm-level monthly treatment eﬀects are then averaged over each month in the sample. The red
hatched lines represent 95 percent conﬁdence intervals for the average consumption eﬀect, obtained
by adding and subtracting s.e. × 1.96 from the top decile consumption eﬀect, where s.e. is the
standard error of the top decile estimate in speciﬁcation (5).
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Table 1: Property Types
1
Customers Obs.
1 Office 805 29,846
2 Industrial 252 8,876
3 Retail + Flex 69 2,240
Property Type
Notes: Property type identiﬁes the primary use of the buildings in our sample. The predominant
share is made up of oﬃce buildings (72 percent), followed by industrial buildings (22 percent),
and ﬁnally by retail and ﬂex buildings, where ﬂex buildings combine oﬃce and retail functions (6
percent).
37
Table 2: Summary statistics and covariate balance in full sample
1
Norm. Diff.
Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
kW 27.3 42.9 33.5 61.4 -0.08
kWh (000s) 7.7 13.8 9.0 17.1 -0.06
Bill ($) 627 999 720 1220 -0.06
Bill Length 30.3 1.3 30.4 1.3 -0.05 -0.054184
Building S.F. (000s) 57.2 59.7 66.8 93.6 -0.09
Year Built 1974 26 1968 33  0.14
Building Stories 2.6 1.6 3.4 3.1 -0.23
Industry 0.12 0.33 0.10 0.31  0.04
Trade, Accommodation 0.15 0.36 0.12 0.33  0.06
Finance, Real Estate, Management 0.47 0.36 0.55 0.50 -0.13
Education, Health, Pub. Admin. 0.19 0.36 0.18 0.38  0.02
Entertainment, Recreation, Services 0.07 0.36 0.05 0.21  0.05
Northeast 0.27 0.44 0.31 0.45 -0.06
Southeast 0.20 0.40 0.22 0.42 -0.03
Northwest 0.13 0.34 0.06 0.23  0.17
Southwest 0.40 0.49 0.41 0.49 -0.01
Observations
Firms
The normalized difference measures the degree of overlap for each covariate across the treated








Notes: The normalized diﬀerence measures the degree of overlap for each covariate across the
treated and control samples. A normalized diﬀerence lower than about 0.25 is typically considered
good overlap.
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Table 3: Summary statistics and covariate balance in top consumption decile
1
Norm. Diff.
Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
kW 132.4 71.2 164.2 120.9 -0.23 -0.1857615
kWh (000s) 40.6 24.1 44.5 34.1 -0.09 -0.0933982
Bill ($) 3002 1759 3276 2403 -0.09 -0.092008
Bill Length 30.4 1.3 30.4 1.3 -0.01 -0.0054808
Building S.F. (000s) 86.8 79.7 144.9 146.4 -0.35 -0.3485544
Year Built 1978 19 1973 24 0.16 0.16334288
Building Stories 3.0 2.4 6.1 5.1 -0.55 -0.5535325
Industry 0.22 0.41 0.18 0.39 0.07 0.07068859
Trade, Accommodation 0.09 0.28 0.04 0.20 0.15 0.14530955
Finance, Real Estate, Management 0.46 0.50 0.77 0.42 -0.47 -0.474737
Education, Health, Pub. Admin. 0.09 0.29 0.00 0.00  0.31 0.31034483
Entertainment, Recreation, Services 0.15 0.35 0.00 0.00  0.43 0.42857143
Northeast 0.28 0.45 0.27 0.44 0.02 0.01588904
Southeast 0.18 0.38 0.32 0.47 -0.23 -0.2316345
Northwest 0.12 0.32 0.00 0.00  0.38 0.375
Southwest 0.43 0.50 0.41 0.49  0.03 0.02856851
Observations
Firms
The normalized difference measures the degree of overlap for each covariate across the treated





Notes: The normalized diﬀerence m asures the degree of overlap for ach covari te across the
treated and control samples. A normalized diﬀerence lower than about 0.25 is typically considered
good overlap.
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Table 4: Logistic Regression
1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
 kW -0.006* -0.004 -0.006 -0.006
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006)
 kWh 0.019 0.022 0.022 0.008
(Thousands) (0.021) (0.023) (0.019) (0.020)
 Bill -0.057 -0.229 -0.162 -0.049
(Thousands) (0.299) (0.311) (0.247) (0.313)
 Bill Length -0.023** -0.012 0.020 0.027
(0.009) (0.011) (0.022) (0.025)
 Stories -0.247 -0.247 -0.383*** -0.349
(0.152) (0.152) (0.147) (0.247)
 Building Size 0.004 0.004 0.019 0.019
(Thousands) (0.004) (0.005) (0.017) (0.017)
 Year Built 0.007 0.007 0.000 0.017
(0.006) (0.006) (0.015) (0.013)
 Property Type 0.048 0.072 0.246 0.339
(0.532) (0.526) (0.510) (0.415)
 Region 0.008 0.021 -0.257 -0.224
(0.165) (0.165) (0.289) (0.299)
 Industry 0.037 0.028 0.488 0.359
(0.159) (0.159) (0.377) (0.334)
 Mand. TOU 0.959 1.180 0.684 1.362
(0.987) (1.140) (1.809) (2.206)
 Vol. TOU -0.152 -0.155 -0.011 0.389
(0.270) (0.271) (1.425) (1.467)
Observations 40,962 39,829 3,905 3,664
Accounts 1,126 1,124 110 103
Pseudo R squared   0.04 0.04 0.19 0.17
Robust standard errors clustered at the building level in parentheses, ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent Variable: Tenant Pays
Full Sample Top Decile
Notes: Results of a logistic regression of a tenant-paid dummy on the observable variables. Column
(1) shows the full sample results; column (2) shows the full sample without two high-consuming
accounts and large bill length observations in the sixth decile; column (3) shows same logistic
speciﬁcation results in the top decile; and column (4) shows the top decile results without out-of-
balance stories observations (buildings greater than 9 stories). Robust standard errors clustered at
the building level in parentheses, ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 5: Covariate balance in switchers to tenant-paid utilities contract
1
No Switch Switch to 
Tenant-Paid





kW 27.7 31.4  0.05 41  0.17
(44.5) (67.3) (65.7)
kWh (000s) 7.8 9.8  0.08 10.7  0.13
(13.9) (22) (16.4)
Bill ($) 632 748  0.06 861  0.15
(1004) (1520) (1190)
Building S.F. (000s) 61.3 197.8  1.01 44.6 -0.20
(73.5) (113.6) (36.8)
Year Built 1973 1986  0.45 1974  0.03
(27.3) (9.5) (14.3)
Building Stories 2.84 13.01  1.23 2.38 -0.17
(2.55) (7.86) (0.97)
Industry 0.12 0.04 -0.22 0.06 -0.15
(0.32) (0.18) (0.24)
Trade, Accommodation 0.15 0 -0.43 0.32  0.29
(0.35) (0) (0.47)
Finance, Real Estate, Management 0.48 0.89  0.69 0.5  0.03
(0.5) (0.32) (0.5)
Education, Health, Pub. Admin. 0.19 0.03 -0.38 0.09 -0.21
(0.39) (0.17) (0.29)
Entertainment, Recreation, Services 0.07 0.05 -0.06 0.02 -0.15
(0.25) (0.22) (0.15)
Northeast 0.26 0.09 -0.32 0.79  0.88
(0.44) (0.28) (0.41)
Southeast 0.21 0.77  0.95 0.1 -0.22
(0.41) (0.42) (0.29)
Northwest 0.12 0.13  0.02 0.04 -0.21
(0.32) (0.33) (0.19)
Southwest 0.42 0.02 -0.8 0.08 -0.61
(0.49) (0.14) (0.26)
City 0.31 0.8  1.03 0.13 -0.42
(0.46) (0.4) (0.34)
Observations 39,544 1,271 1,145
Firms 1,086 34 31
Notes: The normalized diﬀerence measures the degree of overlap for each covariate across the
treated and control samples. A normalized diﬀerence lower than about 0.25 is typically considered
good overlap.
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Table 6: Split Incentive Eﬀect By Consumption Decile
1
Dependent variable: Log Bill
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Tenant x CDD 0.0001
(0.0001)
Tenant x CDD (10th Dec.)    -0.013**    -0.013**   -0.014**   -0.013**     -0.012***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004)
Tenant x CDD (9th Dec.) 0.001 0.001 0.005 -0.006 -0.007
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.007)
Tenant x CDD (8th Dec.) -0.001 -0.001 0.005 0.001 -0.001
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.005)
Tenant x CDD (7th Dec.) -0.004 -0.004 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006)
Tenant x CDD (6th Dec.) 0.010 0.010 0.014* 0.010 0.008
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.006)
Tenant x CDD (5th Dec.) 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.004 0.003
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.005)
Tenant x CDD (4th Dec.) 0.009 0.009 0.012 0.010 0.008
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.007)
Tenant x CDD (3rd Dec.) -0.017 -0.017 -0.017 -0.021 -0.012
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.009)
Tenant x CDD (2nd Dec.) 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.002 0.004
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.005)
Tenant x CDD (1st Dec.) -0.010 -0.011 -0.009 -0.017 -0.007
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.007)
Account & Time F.E.s, Acct. Trend YES YES YES YES YES YES
Switchers Controls YES NO YES YES YES YES
Other Covariate Interactions YES NO NO YES YES YES
Covariate Balance Robustness NO NO NO NO YES YES
Observations 40,962 40,962 40,962 40,962 39,153 39,153
Accounts 1,126 1,126 1,126 1,126 1,104 1,104
R-squared (within) 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.26
Robust standard errors clustered at the building level in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Log Usage
Notes: Column (1) presents results without decile interactions. Columns (2)-(4) presents results in
the full sample. Column (5) presents a robustness check with balanced building stories, bill length,
and peak consumption. Column (6) presents the same speciﬁcation as column (5) but with the
logarithm of monthly bill as dependent variable. Robust standard errors clustered at the building
level in parentheses, ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.













Lower Bound -0.012 
-0.006Upper Bound
 1
Notes: The Oster bounds present an identiﬁed set of treatment eﬀect coeﬃcients by accounting for
residual omitted variable bias through an equal selection assumption. The omitted variable bias is
assumed to be a function of the treatment coeﬃcient and R-squared values before after the inclusion
of covariates, as well as the maximum theoretically possible R-squared, namely from a regression
on consumption and all possible observable and unobservable controls. This maximum R-squared
may not be 1 if there is measurement error in the dependent variable.
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Table 8: External and Private Beneﬁts Per Firm
Low $ High $    Low $    High $
SO2 8.21 16.33 685 1503
NOx 0.75 1.50 678 1489
PM2.5 0.38 0.76 677 1488
CO2 101.95 202.91 779 1690





















External + Private Benefits  External
Notes: External beneﬁts measure the annual per-ﬁrm reduction in pollution damages from lower
electricity consumption. External plus private beneﬁts measure the sum of external and private
beneﬁts, where priv te beneﬁts are the annual bill savings n ted in the tex ($677-$1487). The low
and high values are from the Oster identiﬁed set estimates of electricity saved, discussed in the text.
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